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THEY THE PEOPLE: A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Eric Parnes*
I. INTRODUCTION
To lay claim to the legitimacy of its product, any approach
to constitutional interpretation must satisfy two related condi-
tions. First, the method of interpretation must begin with, de-
rive from, and remain true to some source of the Constitution's
legitimacy. Second, to share in the legitimacy of the Constitu-
tion, the approach to constitutional interpretation must offer
some narrative' that establishes that legitimacy. Neither tradi-
tional approaches nor novel recent proposals2 succeed in satisfy-
ing these two conditions.
Despite the close relationship between the two conditions,
each plays a distinct role in the elucidation of a third-party bene-
ficiary approach to constitutional interpretation. A discussion of
the first condition suggests two points. First, current approaches
fail to connect to any source of the Constitution's legitimacy.
Second, contract law offers a paradigm of how one's method of
interpreting a document might preserve that document's norma-
tive authority.
In the presentation of the second condition necessary for an
* Associate, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed LLP, Washington, D.C. J.D., George-
town University Law Center; B.A., University of Maryland. The author would like
to thank Professor Mark Tushnet, Ryan Lehning, Illomai Kurrick, Mathew Kaiser,
Carl Edman, Nilam Sanghvi, and Ann Pames for their helpful comments and
suggestions on this article.
1. Some account beyond a mere assertion of legitimacy is required. A narra-
tive account represents the ideal: by beginning from some independent source of
legitimacy and describing the relationship between that source and the Constitu-
tion.
2. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999);
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996).
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approach to constitutional interpretation to yield legitimate re-
sults, three issues arise. First, when using a traditional mode of
constitutional interpretation to establish a basis for the Constitu-
tion's legitimacy, one will encounter an initial hurdle in what
has been called the precommitment problem.3 Several solutions
to the basic precommitment problem present themselves and
may prove satisfying. The second issue that arises involves a
more daunting formulation of the precommitment problem for
which the standard solutions fail to account. This problem,
called the intertemporal precommitment problem, 4 may appear
as an insurmountable barrier to the satisfaction of the second
condition to a legitimate approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion. However, the intertemporal precommitment problem may
rest on presumptions of questionable validity.5
In Part III, a close analysis of the presumptions underlying
the intertemporal precommitment problem demonstrates that,
indeed, it is an illusory problem. 6 By questioning some of our
most cherished convictions concerning the nature of liberal de-
mocracy and the United States Constitution, this article dispels
the myths of popular sovereignty that lie at the heart of the in-
tertemporal precommitment problem. With the shaky founda-
tion of the problem razed, Part IV begins to erect a more stable
base on which to rest the enterprise of constitutional interpreta-
tion.7 By conceiving of the Constitution as an agreement made
3. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1993).
4. The problem arises when we ask why, given the fact that we did not write
or ratify the Constitution, we should be bound by its terms. Although I suggest a
new name, the problem itself is far from novel. Bruce Ackerman identifies an al-
most identical problem, which he refers to as the "intertemporal difficulty." See
Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1045-46 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution]. Frank
Michelman calls a more basic version of the problem the "paradox of constitutional
democracy." FRANK 1. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 5 (1999). Michael
Klarman describes a similar difficulty as applied to legislation generally as the
"cross-temporal majorities problem." Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judical Re-
view: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 504 (1997). What I call the in-
tertemporal precommitment problem might be suitably described as an intergen-
erational problem, but that moniker has already been used in the context of
environmental regulation. I have thus chosen to use a new, but appropriately de-
scriptive, term to refer to the problem.
5. The presumptions are that the written Constitution expresses the will of the
people at the time of the enactment and that our system of government represents a
real commitment to popular sovereignty.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
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for the benefit of third parties, the article seeks to restore honesty
and legitimacy to constitutional interpretation. "We the People"
neither wrote the Constitution nor are bound by its terms.8 In-
stead, the framers drafted the Constitution to benefit us, and in-
terpreting it accordingly is the only way to maintain its norma-
tive force.
II. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETIVE
LEGITIMACY IN A CROSS-TEMPORAL WORLD
A. Connecting with a Source of Legitimacy
To lay claim to legitimacy, any approach to constitutional
interpretation must begin with, derive from, and remain true to
some source of the Constitution's legitimacy. 9 If we are to honor
a particular interpretation of the Constitution as legitimate, it
must be because the Constitution itself is legitimate and because
the interpretation shares in that legitimacy. So too, if we are to
accept as legitimate the constitutional interpretations produced
by a particular method of interpretation, we must accept that the
interpretive method proceeds from and sustains constitutional,
legitimacy.10
8. See infra Part IV.C.1.
9. This tenet applies to a method of interpretation's claim to legitimacy as a
method of constitutional interpretation. In common parlance, we might describe an
interpretation as legitimate if it conforms to our substantive preferences, or if it sat-
isfies our ethical or moral philosophy. While this may be one type of legitimacy, it
is of only tangential relevance to an inquiry into methods of constitutional interpre-
tation. The assertion that some interpretation of the Constitution maximizes happi-
ness (utilitarian justice), see, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Samuel
Gorovitz ed., 1971), or would be consistent with a system of justice favored by a ra-
tional person behind a veil of ignorance (Rawlsian justice), see, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), does not, by itself, speak to whether the result constitutes
a legitimate constitutional interpretation. The assertion would more closely address
that question if it included a claim that the Constitution dictates that we maximize
happiness or satisfy Rawlsian justice. The claim would satisfy the condition if
maximizing happiness or satisfying Rawlsian justice also gave legitimacy to the
Constitution-not a great leap. Traditional approaches, however, fail to offer per-
suasive explanations of the source of the Constitution's legitimacy, as I will suggest
in Section B.
10. If connecting to the legitimacy of the Constitution is not a central purpose
of the interpretive enterprise, then that enterprise is at best disingenuous and at
worst empty. The enterprise is disingenuous if it seeks wise or substantively desir-
able policy and then asserts ad hoc that the interpreted document dictates that pol-
icy. Critics of this sort of approach to interpretation often label the practice "judicial
activism." See, e.g., Edwin Meese Il, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
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Developments in contract law during the twentieth century
illustrate the need for a connection between the legitimacy of in-
terpretation and the legitimacy of that which one seeks to inter-
pret. Over the past hundred years, Anglo-American contract
law has been defined by a conflict between classical and modern
doctrine." Debates between proponents of the two basic ap-
proaches to contract interpretation 12 may be reduced to dis-
agreement over the source of contract authority.
Although the classical and modern approaches to contract
interpretation differ in many respects, perhaps the most obvious
distinction arises in their treatments of the intent of contracting
parties.13 In broad terms, classical contract law approached in-
terpretation seeking objective manifestation of the intent of the
parties.14 Modern contract law emphasizes the subjective intent
1990). Meese noted that the problem with interpretations grounded "in appeals to
social theories, to moral philosophies or personal notions of human dignity ... is
not that it is bad constitutional law, but that it is not constitutional law in any mean-
ingful sense at all." Id. at 18.
11. See P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 7-8 (5th ed.
1995); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer
and Acceptance, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1994). Suggesting a rigid dichotomy be-
tween classical and modern approaches belies the complexity of the many issues
that have arisen in contract law. Other taxonomies may better express the different
directions taken by twentieth-century scholars. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Rela-
tional Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978). For the purposes of this illustra-
tion, however, broad and oversimplified distinctions between the classical and
modern approaches will suffice.
12. As used here in its imprecise sense, the term "interpretation" subsumes two
related, but distinct enterprises: interpretation and construction. Corbin observes:
Although these two words are most often used synonymously, a distinc-
tion between them does exist. Through 'interpretation' of a contract, a
court determines what meanings the parties, when contracting, gave to the
language used. Through 'construction' of a contract, a court determines
the legal operation of the contract - its effect upon the rights and duties of
the parties.
5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.3, at 8 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
rev. ed. 1998).
For purposes of this discussion, the distinction between construction and
interpretation will blur in usage, but ought to persist in mind. To the extent that
one approach might emphasize construction more than interpretation, the distinc-
tion remains significant. Nonetheless, "the interchangeable use of the terms" is
widespread, id. at 11, and alternative language adequately describes the differences
in approach. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 1128-29 (contrasting the functions
of default rules and expression rules and of objective and standardized interpreta-
tions).
13. See infra notes 19-20.
14. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 1130-35. An opinion by Learned Hand
represents the classical approach:
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of the contracting parties.15
In evaluating these competing approaches, we have two
primary options. We might ask whether one or the other ap-
proach can succeed on its own terms. Thus, we might argue that
the modern approach fails because one can never know the sub-
jective intent of contracting parties. At a more fundamental
level, we might ask whether either approach yields interpreta-
tions that legitimately bind parties. To answer this question, we
must ask why society cares about interpreting contracts, why it
chooses to enforce contracts at all, and why it considers them le-
gitimate.
In the abstract, both classical and modern approaches "be-
gin with the proposition that a contract is normative-a guide to
conduct for the parties in relation to each other and for a judge
asked to adjudicate their rights and duties." 16 This assumption
of normativity may rest on any number of theoretical grounds,
"including theories of promise, autonomy, consent, rule utility,
[and] fairness." 17 A belief that any one of these theories explains
why society chooses to enforce contracts may determine which
approach to contract interpretation ought to prevail.
An answer to the question of why a contract should be en-
forced goes a long way toward resolving how a contract should
be enforced. If we believe that contracts may be legitimately en-
forced insofar as they express the will of the parties, we should
favor an interpretive approach that seeks to determine that in-
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or indi-
vidual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by the
mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordi-
narily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words, in-
tended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes
upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake,
or something of the sort.
Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
15. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 1130-35. The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts adopts the modem approach: "Where the parties have attached the same
meaning to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance
with that meaning." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (1981) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT SECOND]. The objective/ subjective dichotomy does not hold
under all circumstances, as demonstrated by the equivocation at the end of Judge
Learned Hand's statement in Hotchkiss. See Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293-94. For this illus-
tration, however, we can stipulate that classical means objective and modern means
subjective.
16. Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract,
3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 118 (1993).
17. Id. at 118.
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tent. This starting point will likely lead to adoption of the mod-
ern approach, which concerns itself with the subjective intent of
the contracting parties.18
B. Establishing a Source of Legitimacy
In constitutional interpretation, the underlying basis for le-
gitimacy-the reason for honoring the Constitution such that we
care whether a particular interpretation is correct-is largely
dismissed, avoided, or ignored.1 9 Jed Rubenfeld has insisted
that originalists have never provided an account "explaining
why the will of the dead should govern." 20 The failure to
ground interpretation in the legitimacy of the Constitution is a
deficiency not limited to original intent approaches. 21 Put sim-
ply, in championing one or another approach to constitutional
interpretation, commentators seldom address the basic question:
so what? Why should it matter that an interpretation derives
from the Constitution's text or remains true to the founders' in-
tent? These questions suggest the second, and central, defect
that plagues approaches to constitutional interpretation. Ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation are unable to share in
the legitimacy of the Constitution because they are unable to es-
tablish that legitimacy. This inability derives from the intertem-
poral precommitment problem.
The intertemporal precommitment problem is a more chal-
lenging version of the basic precommitment problem in constitu-
tional theory.22 The trouble in its basic form arises when we
18. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
19. The idea of an interpretive approach maintaining constitutional legitimacy
has been addressed. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 9
(1991) ("Judicial review is... a practice by which constitutional legitimacy is as-
sured, not endowed."); see also PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (pro-
posing six modalities of constitutional argument as the basis of legitimacy for judi-
cial review). The problem with Professor Bobbitt's modalities-of-constitutional-
argument approach is that it purports to maintain legitimacy only upon the as-
sumption that the Constitution has an independent source of legitimacy.
20. Jed Rubenfeld, Textualism and Democratic Legitimacy: The Moment and the
Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1104 (1998).
21. Professor Rubenfeld overstates the extent of the deficiency with regard to
originalist approaches. See id. While he may be right, and I certainly agree, that
originalism cannot ground its interpretive approach in an acceptable account of con-
stitutional legitimacy, the suggestion that originalists cannot offer any account is
inaccurate.
22. The precommitment problem as it arises in constitutional theory resembles,
but is not equivalent to, the precommitment problem that philosophers illustrate
with the tale of Ulysses and the Sirens. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in
[Vol. 43
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consider "two clashing commitments: one to the ideal of gov-
ernment constrained by law ('constitutionalism'), the other to
the ideal of government by act of the people ('democracy')." 23
When these commitments clash in the present tense, potential
solutions present themselves. For instance, one might argue that
commitment to the ideal of government by act of the people re-
quires a commitment to government constrained by laws that
protect the processes necessary for government by the people.24
Or, one might insist that the people make law in two different
ways, one everyday and one constitutional, and that the gov-
ernment ought to honor the commitments that the people make
when they act in their more public-regarding constitutional
lawmaking capacity.25
Any number of reasons, of various adequacies, might be of-
fered to explain why we as democratic actors ought to honor the
constitutional commitments that we have made.26 These reasons,
however, generally fail to explain why commitments made by
other people more than 200 years ago should limit present-day
popular sovereignty. This is the intertemporal precommitment
problem. Put simply, we did not write or ratify the Constitution,
so why should it constrain our self-government?27
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 215 (Joel Feinburg & Hyman Gross eds., 3d ed. 1986).
Whereas the Ulysses and the Sirens issue concerns the binding force of individual
commitments, the basic constitutional precommitment problem involves commit-
ments made at the level of the polity. See id.
23. MICHELMAN, supra note 4, at 4; see also Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions,
Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 3 (Doug-
las Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (noting conflict between constitutional and democ-
ratic theory in constitutional democracies). The precommitment problem, in both
its basic and intertemporal form, should be distinguished from the closely related
"counter-majoritarian difficulty." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (1962). The counter-majoritarian difficulty focuses on institutional roles,
particularly the vesting of judicial review with the Supreme Court. See generally id.
For two reasons, the counter-majoritarian difficulty will not trouble a third-party
beneficiary approach. First, though the third-party beneficiary approach implies
judicial interpretation of the Constitution, it need not rule out the involvement of
other institutions. Second, to prove coherent, the third-party beneficiary approach
requires a denial that the Constitution represents the sort of commitment to popular
sovereignty that leads to the counter-majoritarian difficulty. See infra Part II.B.
24. This is a very rough account of legal process theory's approach to the prob-
lem. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
25. This is a rough account of Professor Ackerman's "dualist democracy." See
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS].
26. For example, that by playing the game and participating in the democratic
process, one implicitly consents to respect its outcomes.
27. The force of this problem is captured in the observation that we have more
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A demonstration that most major approaches to constitu-
tional law fail to resolve (or dissolve) the intertemporal pre-
commitment problem would exceed the scope of this paper.
Most approaches tend either to follow Locke and Madison in as-
serting that later generations consent tacitly,28 or to develop
some mechanism by which each generation can be said to com-
mit.29 By attempting to dissolve the problem, this article shows
that the theoretical acrobatics in which many commentators en-
gage are unnecessary. Nonetheless, to demonstrate the reach of
the intertemporal precommitment problem, this article briefly
suggests how one of the more promising maneuvers at the diffi-
culty comes up short.
Professor Ackerman's "dualist democracy"3 0 approach fails
because it does not account for the possibility that our democ-
ratic activity might be constrained by higher-lawmaking choices
made by past generations. This constraint appears operative to-
day-much of the population has not lived through a "constitu-
tional moment." Put simply, Ackerman cannot adequately ex-
plain why we should be bound by choices that may have been
made by past generations. To say that we can nullify or amend
these choices through constitutional moments does not advance
the discussion beyond the point where we acknowledge that we
can nullify or amend choices through Article V amendment. An
easier amendment process does not solve the intertemporal pre-
commitment problem. Even if today's population could change
the commitments of past generations by a vote of a majority plus
in common with the people of present-day Canada than we do with the framers, yet
we would never accept as legitimate the application of Canadian law within our
borders.
28. See GARY ROSEN, AMERICAN COMPACT: JAMES MADISON AND THE PROBLEM
OF FOUNDING 133 (1999); see also Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent 1, 59 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 990 (1965) (providing a more sophisticated version of the tacit consent ap-
proach).
29. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25; JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 314-15 (rev.
ed. 1999) (grounding constitutional commitment on self-interested adherence to
conventional rules).
30. See supra text accompanying note 25. Professor Ackerman offers this de-
scription of the dualist view: "our Constitution is one great effort to distinguish be-
tween those rare acts of representative government backed by the considered judg-
ments of the mass of mobilized citizens and the countless actions based on
something less than this." Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 4, at
1046.
[Vol. 43
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one,31 one still has reason to ask why the choices of past genera-
tions should constrain popular sovereignty even to that limited
extent. 32
III. DISSOLVING THE INTERTEMPORAL PRECOMMITMENT PROBLEM
(OR STRIVING TO BECOME COMPLETELY ADULT JURISTS) 33
The intertemporal precommitment problem appears to pre-
sent an obstacle to legitimacy in constitutional interpretation. To
frame an approach to constitutional interpretation that both
maintains the legitimacy of the constitution and establishes a ba-
sis for that legitimacy, one must somehow overcome the in-
tertemporal precommitment problem. On its own, the third-
party beneficiary approach cannot succeed at this task. Instead,
the approach will emerge as a legitimate and legitimizing in-
strument following the reader's recognition that the intertempo-
ral precommitment problem does not, in fact, exist.
The problem arises only upon acceptance of two faulty pre-
sumptions. To have meaning, the intertemporal precommitment
problem requires first, that the written Constitution express the
will of the people at the time of enactment, and second, that we
believe in popular sovereignty. If neither of these presumptions
holds, we have no reason to ask why the people of today are
31. The "plus one" may be important to the intertemporal precommitment
problem in the constitutional context. If a simple majority could reverse commit-
ments made in the past, these "commitments" would not bind in the way that con-
stitutional commitments bind. Cf. Brett W. King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical
Context, Popular Sovereignty, and Supermajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609, 611
(2000) ("Once simple majority is departed from, there is no logical stopping point
between a fifty-one percent rule and autocracy.").
32. A stronger version of this point asks why decisions made in the past ought
to be treated as baselines, alteration of which requires some affirmative activity by
today's political community. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION
41-67 (1993).
33. Jerome Frank labeled Justice Holmes "The Completely Adult Jurist."
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 253 (1935). Frank believed that
Holmes had
abandoned, once and for all, the phantasy [sic] of a perfect, consistent, le-
gal uniformity, and has never tried to perpetuate the pretense that there is
or can be one. He has put away childish longings for a father-controlled
world .... As a consequence, whatever clear vision of legal realities we
have attained in this country in the past twenty-five years is in large
measure due to him.
Id. This part strives to dispel some of the fantasies and myths that pervade discus-
sions of government and law in the United States. In so doing, it aspires to live up
to Frank's idealized view of Justice Holmes by leading toward "sane and honest
recognition of how the law works." Id.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
bound by the will of the people from a past generation. The in-
tertemporal precommitment problem dissolves with the realiza-
tion that the Constitution is not the product of popular sover-
eignty and does not bind The People of today by limiting its
popular sovereignty. 34
A. The Founding Myth: The Will of the American People
"The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid
basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The streams of na-
tional power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original
fountain of all legitimate authority." 35 Hamilton's words have
great rhetorical force, but the framing and ratification of the
Constitution deviated from this democratic sentiment. The
state-based mechanism by which the Constitution was ratified
supports the conclusion that, even if citizens had genuine input
in the ratification decision,36 they acted as state citizens, not as
The American People.37
Despite the problems of representation and deliberation
raised below, even if the people of every state participated in
ratifying the Constitution, they did not do so as The People of
the United States. Instead, the ratification mechanism, as the
Constitution provides in Article VII, specifies that the decision
34. Refutation of only the second of these presumptions, that of popular sover-
eignty, is both a necessary and sufficient condition for truly dissolving the in-
tertemporal precommitment problem. Even if we demonstrate that the Constitu-
tion does not express the will of The People at the time of the framing and
ratification, the problem may persist in a slightly altered form. If, however, we
show that the Constitution fails to bind present-day Americans, the intertemporal
precommitment problem dissolves. Nonetheless, invalidating the first presumption
will further the discussion in two ways. First, the argument will raise questions
about the relationship between representation and consent that will help drive the
refutation of the popular-sovereignty presumption. Second, the argument will pro-
vide a foundation for the discussion in Part IV.C. of the identity of the parties to the
Constitution-as-contract.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
36. This section discusses the extent to which the People of the States qua state
citizens might have participated as parties to the ratification. See infra Part IV.C.1.
37. One argument that I will not raise is the "Dead White Men" line. See, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term Forward: The Document and the Doc-
trine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 36 (2000). Recognizing that the exclusion of large seg-
ments of the population from participation in government presents serious prob-
lems for any claims about consent of "The People," I prefer to deal with the
founding generation on its own terms. Even if we can coherently equate white,
male landowners with The People, that group did not ratify the Constitution. See
text accompanying notes 36-39.
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rests with "the Conventions of [the] States." 38 This specification
proves important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that, in-
sofar as "The People" played a role in ratification, they did so as
citizens of their respective states rather than as part of some
monolithic entity. Second, the ratification mechanism, consid-
ered in light of the contemporary population distribution, dem-
onstrates that the consent of The American People, insofar as
such a group could be said to exist, had no relevance to the legal
fate of the Constitution.39
Article VII of the new Constitution provides the manner of
ratification.40 In so doing, it fails to mention "The People" or
"citizens" as participants in the process. Instead, the Constitu-
tion designates state "Conventions" as the relevant actors in the
ratification process.41 Some commentators have emphasized
that the specification of state Conventions as the ratifying enti-
ties in preference to state legislatures signifies the Constitution's
connection to "The People." 42 This view, however, implausibly
stresses the importance of Article VII's "Conventions" in such a
way that it fails to recognize the greater significance of the
"States."43
To understand the ratification mechanism, the first question
should not concern the distinction between legislature and Con-
vention. Instead, one ought to ask what political entity the Con-
stitution specified as responsible for ratification. Two reason-
able answers present themselves, and neither is "The People of
the United States." Article VII recognizes the authority of either
38. See U.S. CONST. art. VII.
39. I say "legal" fate to distinguish the conditions for success set by the Consti-
tution from more practical conditions for success. The Constitution could not have
prevailed in the face of mass adamant opposition. Its success in the ratification
process, however, ought not to imply the converse practical condition, that the
Constitution enjoyed mass popular support. See infra text accompanying notes 55-
60.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. VII.
41. See id.
42. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25, at 168 (The framing Con-
vention "refused to permit existing state governments to veto its authority to speak
for the People"); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In my view, however, it is well settled that the whole
people of the United States asserted their political identity and unity of purpose
when they created the federal system.").
43. See U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate
source of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual
State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.").
2003]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
each state or each state's citizens to ratify the Constitution.44 The
correct answer, I believe, is that Article VII accepts the authority
of each state, as a sovereign political entity, to ratify the Consti-
tution.45 Nonetheless, even if we accept that the citizens of each
state ratified the Constitution, we cannot conclude that they did
so as anything but citizens of their respective states. That the
ratification decision occurred at the level of the state rather than
at the level of a national polity is further demonstrated by the
demographic context in which Article VII operated. 4
6
While the Articles of Confederation required unanimous
consent of the States to dissolve or amend its terms,47 the newly
framed Constitution provided that "[tihe Ratification of the
Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establish-
ment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the
Same." 48 Given the emphasis on states as the political entities
relevant to ratification and considering the population distribu-
tion in the late 1780s, Article VII rendered irrelevant the will of
The American People. This conclusion holds even if we assume,
in spite of the problems presented by non-proxy representa-
tion,49 that the votes at state conventions accurately reflect the
44. See U.S. CONST. art. VII.
45. The belief that the specification of Conventions as the mechanism for ratifi-
cation recognizes the people of each state as sovereign has a tenuous foundation.
First, Article VII fails to provide guidance to the States on how they should com-
pose their Conventions. That the word "Convention" did not automatically suggest
popularly elected delegates is demonstrated by the fact that the framers, who were
appointed by their state legislatures, called their assembly a Convention. See JACK
N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 376-77 (rev. ed. 1982). Second, if the direct consent of
state citizens was a priority to the framers, they presumably would have specified a
referendum-type ratification mechanism.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 47-56.
47. Article XIII provided:
[Tihe Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every
state and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time
hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a
congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legisla-
tures of every state.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII, in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY 69 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1989).
48. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
49. The problem of non-proxy representation is suggested in the difference be-
tween delegates and trustees. While a delegate essentially delivers a proxy for his
constituents' vote, a trustee is empowered to exercise judgment and deliberate, so
long as he seeks to promote the interests of his beneficiaries. See DON HERZOG,
HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 210 (1989) (suggesting a distinction
between the nature of authority wielded by delegates and trustees). I take up this
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distribution of consent among the state population.
In 1790,50 the thirteen states had a combined population
close to four million.51 Of this population, over 2.1 million, or
56% of the total, lived in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, or Virginia, the four most heavily populated states.52
Given these numbers, we can imagine scenarios in which the
Constitution might have been ratified despite the opposition of a
majority of the nation's population. 53 The possibility of this re-
sult under the ratification mechanism makes it difficult to char-
acterize constitutional ratification as an enterprise based on the
consent of The People.
The simple, but unlikely, version of this type of scenario in-
volves 100% of the citizens of the four largest states opposing
ratification with 51% of each of the remaining nine states favor-
ing ratification. In this scenario, which illustrates the lowest
level of (hypothetical) popular support that could satisfy Article
VII, the Constitution would be ratified by approximately 22% of
the American people.54
In a more plausible scenario, and one which, in fact, ob-
tained for four days in 1788, 55 the Constitution could be officially
ratified, even though a sizable majority of the American people
had not consented. On June 21, 1788, the third Constitutional
Convention convened in New Hampshire in under a year finally
issue in the next section and in Part IV.C.
50. While the ratification debates occurred between 1787 and 1790, the first re-
liable population statistics do not appear to have been collected until the last of
these years. See U.S. CONSTITUTION COUNCIL OF THE THIRTEEN ORIGINAL STATES &
THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, Chronology (Patrick T. Conley & John P.
Kaminski eds., 1988) [hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES]. Nonethe-
less, there is no evidence of a substantial population change during the period of
ratification.
51. The number was 3,843,789. Population figures are based on calculations
using data in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 50.
52. The number is 2,160,429. See id. The populations of the four largest states
were: Virginia (821,287), Massachusetts (475,327), Pennsylvania (434,373), and
North Carolina (429,442). See id.
53. While there was nothing magical about majoritarianism as a means of de-
termining consent of a population, it seems that one cannot viably claim that a
group in which a majority disapproves of a measure consents to that measure.
54. Fifty-one percent of the population of the nine smallest states is 858,513. See
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 50.
55. See Jere Daniell, New Hampshire, Ideology and Hardball: Ratification of the Fed-
eral Constitution in New Hampshire, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra
note 50, at 181.
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voted for ratification, and New Hampshire became the ninth
state to ratify the Constitution.5 6 At that point, under Article
VII's terms, the Constitution had been established.5 7 If we as-
sume that the votes of the delegates in each of the states ratifying
conventions proportionately represented the will of the popula-
tion of their states, we discover that the Constitution was, in fact,
ratified with the consent of a minority of the population.5 8 At
the point of the Constitution's official establishment through
ratification by nine states, only 34% of the country's population
had approved of the Constitution, if we accept that their dele-
gates proportionately represented their rates of approval or dis-
approval.5 9 The possibility of ratification in the absence of popu-
56. See id.
57. Had the final four states not followed suit, the fate of the Constitution, Arti-
cle VII notwithstanding, would have been in grave doubt. See id.
58. The assumption of proportional representation proceeds as though, in any
given state, each delegate's vote expresses the will of an equal number of state citi-
zens. Thus, in a hypothetical state convention where a population of 100,000
elected 100 delegates, a convention vote of sixty in favor and forty opposed to ratifi-
cation would, under the assumption of perfect representation, signify that 60,000 of
that state's citizens favored ratification while 40,000 opposed ratification.
Perfect proportional representation is, of course, a fiction. However, in this context,
the calculations that such an assumption yields probably bias towards larger popu-
lations favoring ratification than was actually the case. For, while the conventions
of three states, Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia, voted unanimously in favor of
ratification, no conventions voted unanimously against ratification. See THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 50. Given the debates held in each of
these states, it is highly unlikely that their populations supported ratification with
substantial unanimity. See id. In Georgia, for example, twenty-nine delegates par-
ticipated in the State Convention, but only twenty-six voted. See Albert B. Saye,
Georgia: Security through Union, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note
50, at 77, 88-89.
The defects in proportional representation might have weighed even more
heavily in favor of ratification than the implausibility of three states giving unani-
mous consent suggests. See Charles W. Roll, Jr., We, Some of the People: Apportion-
ment in the Thirteen State Conventions Ratifying the Constitution, 56 J. AM. HIST. 21
(1969-70) (identifying manipulative apportionment of voting districts by pro-
ratification state legislators).
For a good summary of enfranchisement and voter turnout during the ratifying
conventions, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 475, 563 nn.255-57 (1995). Professors Ackerman and Katyal criticize
the assumption of proportional representation in developing "vote counts." See id.
at 566 n.259. While I agree that these numbers do not represent historical fact, they
do illustrate plausible scenarios that suggest something less than a theoretical or
practical commitment to a Constitution approved by The People of the United
States.
59. See THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 50. One might object, at
this point, that the relevant population at the point of ratification by nine states
ought to include only the populations of those states. Article VII provides that rati-
fication by nine States is "sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution be-
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lar consent proved more than hypothetical, at least for several
days, 60 and suggests that the consent of The People qua The
People of the United States had no relevance to the establish-
ment of the Constitution.
B. Denying Democracy: Why We Don't Rule
At first blush, denying popular sovereignty 61 in America
tween the States so ratifying the Same." U.S. CONST. art. VII (emphasis added). Be-
cause, the objection would run, ratification established the Constitution only as to
the ratifying states, the will of populations in other states was irrelevant.
This objection fails for two reasons. First, it concedes the disunity between
the people, acting as citizens of their respective states, and The People of Amer-
ica-the very point at issue. Second, it ignores the fact that the establishment of the
Constitution essentially nullified the Articles of Confederation, and thus affected
the populations of all thirteen states, regardless of their decision on ratification. See
Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 58, at 479-80.
60. Virginia voted to ratify on June 25, 1788. See THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
STATES, supra note 50. The last state to do so, Rhode Island, ratified the Constitution
on May 29, 1790. See id. One might also note that there is good reason to question
whether the decisions of the hold-out states, Rhode Island in particular, could be
described as consensual under any meaningful definition of the term. See Patrick T.
Conley, First in War, Last in Peace, Rhode Island and the Constitution, 1786-1790, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 50, at 269, 287 ("The principal proximate
cause for Rhode Island ratification was the economic coercion exerted upon the
state by the new federal government.").
61. I wish to avoid using the term "popular sovereignty" in its rhetorical sense,
to mean, as James Wilson argued during the ratification debates, that "in our gov-
ernment, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people."
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 432 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1996). Used in this way, the idea
of popular sovereignty is essentially a truism. In the rhetorical sense, the masses,
such that they are the masses, may always be said to retain popular sovereignty, in
that they may always topple the government by force or force of will, rather than by
law. This "Right of Revolution," however, probably does not accord with what
most people mean when they talk of democracy or popular sovereignty. See Don-
ald L. Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and
Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REV. 52, 63 (1985) (discussing the
centrality of a right to revolt in Locke's conception of the social contract). Few
would likely accept that a democratic government is any that popular revolution
can practically (rather than legally) topple. The idea is particularly unappealing if
one considers its absurd implication that popular sovereignty can be said to have
existed in any government, no matter how despotic, that is toppled by a people's
revolution. The assertion that all government flows from the people expresses a
view about humanity's original condition that tells us nothing about the nature of a
particular government.
When I speak of popular sovereignty, I mean identity of government and
the governed. The term means that the people, or populace, exercise "paramount
control of the constitution and frame of government and its administration." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "sovereignty") (emphasis added),
quoted in Brett W. King, Wild Political Dreaming: Historical Context, Popular Sover-
eignty, and Supermajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 609, 625 (2000) (identifying two
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might appear heretical, or at least implausible. On closer exami-
nation, however, it will become apparent that most people do
not genuinely believe that The People rule and that the idea that
they do has little basis in reality. The idea of popular sover-
eignty is a valuable and durable myth, promoting loyalty62 and
patriotism. 63 "From the creation of the Constitution,... democ-
racy in America was no longer something to be discussed skep-
tically and challenged but a faith to which all Americans and all
American institutions must unquestioningly adhere."64 That we
perpetuate the myth in our schools and our public discourse
should come as no surprise.65 That members of the legal acad-
emy devoted to the understanding of our system of government
should operate under the haze of this democratic mythology,
however, is simply fantastic.
The intertemporal precommitment problem presumes a
baseline identity between government and The People, and de-
mands that we account for any limitations on the sovereignty of
that entity.66 Once we deny that identity, the problem dissolves,
even if we acknowledge that the Constitution provides for citi-
zen input in government. If we are not the government, we are
not bound by limitations on government action.67 Two points,
one practical and the other theoretical, suggest the disunity of
government and The People. On a practical level, citizens do not
function as government during "normal lawmaking," 68 and they
types of sovereignty).
62. Popular sovereignty promotes loyalty because the artisans of the law ought
to respect their craft.
63. It promotes patriotism because our country stands alone among nations as
one governed by its citizens.
64. Gordon S. Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 1, 17 (Robert A. Goldwin &
William A. Schambra eds., 1980).
65. Remember that the Federalist papers and the Declaration of Independence,
the origin of many myths about popular sovereignty, were propaganda devices.
See id. at 15.
66. See generally Ackerman, Discovering the Constitution, supra note 4.
67. The Constitution might also bind us by regulating our non-lawmaking con-
duct. I suggest that the Constitution does not bind our ordinary conduct save for
two anomalous instances. Where the Constitution does bind ordinary conduct, it
functions not as a constitution, but as a body of conventional law that is difficult to
alter. Regardless, invoking these two anomalies (the Thirteenth and the Twenty-
first Amendments) does nothing to revive the intertemporal precommitment prob-
lem. See infra Part IV.E.
68. Professor Ackerman distinguishes between normal and higher lawmaking.
See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25, at 7. He acknowledges that during
times of normal lawmaking, The People do not speak. See id.
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believe, and behave as though, the government were "other."
On a theoretical level, "representative democracy," though per-
haps the best a large nation can do,69 cannot unify citizens and
government. 70
1. Power vs. Patronage in Modern Government
As a practical matter, citizens do not function as govern-
ment or as political artisans of the law in the day-to-day govern-
ance of the country.71 Leaving aside, for now, the theoretical
questions raised by representative democracy, a look at how
government operates and how people interact with and conceive
of the government suggests the practical implausibility of popu-
lar sovereignty.
We might begin by noting the implications of the fact that
citizens "interact" with the government. Citizens reluctantly fol-
low laws with which they do not agree, they complain about
taxes and other government actions and demands, and they
speak of the government in the third person. In virtually every
sphere of our lives we behave as though the government were
other. That we interact with, rather than identify with, govern-
ment may be no more than semantics-a part can interact with
the whole. However, the rejection of the myth of popular sover-
69. Cf. JOHN DUNN, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY IN THE FACE OF THE FUTURE 28
(2d ed. 1993) ("Today, in politics, democracy is the name of what we cannot have-
yet cannot cease to want."); Winston Churchill, Address to the House of Commons
(Nov. 11, 1947), in THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 231 (Rhonda
Thomas Tripp ed., 1970) (declaring that "[diemocracy is the worst form of govern-
ment except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time").
70. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 145 (1984) ("Representation is incompatible with freedom
because it delegates and thus alienates political will at the cost of genuine self-
government and autonomy.").
71. Because higher lawmaking, in Professor Ackerman's scheme of dualist de-
mocracy, results in constitutional law, see ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25,
at 6-7, it has no real relevance to the question of whether the Constitution binds citi-
zens-as-lawmakers. The idea of constitutional amendment by The People during
periods of higher lawmaking provides a potential justification for constraining the
lawmaking power of citizens. If Professor Ackerman succeeds in dissolving the in-
tertemporal precommitment problem, it is because he accepts the disunity of gov-
ernment and The People during periods of normal lawmaking, not because he prof-
fers the idea of The People speaking during periods of higher lawmaking. While I
disagree with Professor Ackerman's characterization of constitutional moments, the
possibility of such moments is not inconsistent with a third party beneficiary ap-
proach. As I suggest, profound shifts in popular interpretation of constitutional
guarantees may function as amendments under the theory of third-party reliance.
See infra Part IV.F.
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eignty finds clear support in what people say and do.72
2. Modern Representative Democracy as Oxymoron
Representative democracy as it exists today bears little re-
semblance to the ideal of democracy as government by the peo-
ple.73 This is not to say that the ideal of democracy should be
our ideal form of government. 74 As the framers recognized, de-
liberation is important to good government, and meaningful de-
liberation among the whole of the people is implausible in any-
thing but the smallest polities.75 If our concern is consent to the
acts of government, modern representative democracy may not
pose problems. If, however, we care about popular sovereignty,
representative democracy simply fails to fulfill our ideals.
The crucial problem arises when we consider the difference
between representation as conduit for our decisions and repre-
72. The clearest evidence comes from two sources: public opinion polls and the
documented rise in direct voter ballot initiatives. See, e.g., CBS News/NY Times Poll,
Accession Number 0243422, Question 1, Aug. 1995, available at LEXIS, Public Opinion
Online (finding, in survey of 1,478 adults nationwide that only 13% believed inter-
preted the phrase "the government" to mean "representative democracy (govern-
ment by and for the people)" or "The people/Society as a whole," compared to 16%
who responded "Those who control our destiny/The powerful/Power/Big shots");
CBS News Poll, Accession Number 0368697, Question 3, Feb. 2000, available at LEXIS,
Public Opinion Online (finding, in survey of 1,499 adults nationwide that 39% of
respondents feel that their views are represented in the national government);
Becky Kruse, Comment, The Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition
Ads Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CAL. L. REV. 129, 137 (2001) ("By
1998, the 1990s had already surpassed every other decade of the century in the ini-
tiative activity.").
73. See, e.g., ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (2d ed. 1976) (ar-
guing that only unanimous direct democracy creates full compatibility between the
autonomy of the individual and the authority of the state). As for the Constitution,
"[it is simply a reality that the Constitution was far from a majoritarian document-
the Constitution itself does not contemplate any form of direct, unmediated law-
making by the people-and its status as perhaps the most democratic document of
its time cannot hide this fact." Henry Paul Monaghan, We The People[s], Original
Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 130 (1996)
(criticizing proposals for non-Article V amendment of the Constitution).
74. "[T]he concept of self-government that we have derived from democracy is
no more desirable as a norm than it is accurate as a description." Edward L. Rubin,
Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 731-32 (2001).
75. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 114-19. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("the public voice, pronounced by the
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose"). The Constitu-
tional Convention rejected proposals that would have yielded either something
akin to direct democracy or a right of voters to instruct representatives. See Marci
A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
1, 8 (1996-97).
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sentation as delegation of decision-making authority. 76 To illus-
trate the difference, consider investments made in a mutual
fund.
I may have consented to trades made by the manager of my
mutual fund. I chose him and I could take my money elsewhere,
but I would be lying if I said that I managed my money. This is
the case even if I made occasional suggestions on investments or
selected the fund because I approved of the manager's trading
style and agreed with the majority of his choices. He retains the
ultimate decision-making power (except as to whether he con-
tinues to manage my money). When things go well, I could take
pride in my choice of an able manager, but I could not demand
credit for his decisions.
In the same way, we may be said to consent to the decisions
made by "our" government (even though our alternatives are
not so strong as in the selection of a mutual fund manager). We
might be said (this is, of course, a fiction) to select the decision-
makers in government. Even if we assume popular consent,
however, we cannot assume popular sovereignty. No matter
what degree of choice we have as to who makes the decisions,
the person we select, and not us, makes the decision. Our range
of choices does not reach policy. Our options do not extend be-
yond participation in the selection of decision-makers and some
limited input in the decision-making process. If we do not actu-
ally make the decisions on policy and execution, do we govern
in any meaningful sense of the term?
Now, to the point as it pertains to the intertemporal pre-
commitment problem. If the SEC limits the types of trades that
my mutual fund manager can make, have my options been lim-
ited? While certainly I might feel the impact of the regulations,
and I might complain that my mutual fund made more money
before their implementation, my range of choices has not
changed, because the same regulations apply to any mutual
fund manager whom I might choose. The same applies to gov-
ernment. The Constitution may limit the choices that the gov-
76. A stronger version of the claim against popular sovereignty would go fur-
ther by pointing out that we have not, in fact, even delegated our decision-making
authority to representatives in government. For, the argument would go, we never
possessed such decision-making authority, even in our collective capacity as The
People. In the absence of some system extrinsic to The People themselves through
which we could determine what decision The People had made, there is no popular
decision-making authority.
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ernment can make, but those limitations do not alter our range
of choices. Because the decisions are not ours to make, restric-
tions on decisional autonomy are not limitations on our auton-
omy. If the Constitution limits only government choice and ac-
tion, it cannot bind the people.
Note that at this point, this article has dispensed with the
need for any sort of consent theory or other social-contract like
approach to account for the authority of the Constitution. This
analysis has not yet accounted for that authority, but we know
that it does not limit popular sovereignty and thus requires no
justification relative to the people. In the absence of popular
sovereignty, the intertemporal precommitment problem as it
applies to the Constitution simply dissolves. If the Constitution
does not further limit our choices, what effect does it have, and
on what basis can we call certain interpretations legitimate? It is
here that the third party beneficiary approach proves helpful.
IV. A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
A. Why a Third-party Beneficiary Approach?
Establishing a distinction between the entities "the govern-
ment" and "the people" may throw a wrench into the logical
workings of the intertemporal precommitment problem, but
many questions remain. Even if the Constitution does not bind
us, it does seem to do something. At the very least, it appears to
make demands that affect our lives. Constitutional commit-
ments, although not commitments made by or operative upon
citizens, are nonetheless very real and very important. Looking
at the Constitution from the perspective of contract law allows
us to understand whom, how, and why these commitments
bind. Further, by treating the Constitution as an agreement
made for the benefit of a third-party-a proposition that will
prove extremely plausible given the rules of contract law per-
taining to third-party beneficiaries-we can produce interpreta-
tions that establish, derive from, and share in the legitimacy of
the Constitution.
Development of the third-party beneficiary approach pro-
ceeds here in six measured steps. Part B provides a brief account
of contract law as it governs third-party beneficiaries. The next
parts address several questions in an attempt to fit the Constitu-
tion into the framework of contract law. Part C raises and at-
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tempts to answer the question, "if we conceive of the Constitu-
tion as analogous to a contract, who are the parties to that con-
tract?" The answer to this question builds on Part III by further
demonstrating that The People are not parties to the Constitu-
tion-as-contract. Part D asks how the Constitution can be read
as an agreement undertaken for the benefit of a third party, and
how we can identify the beneficiaries. Part E then asks what ef-
fect the Constitution-as-contract has on contemporary Ameri-
cans. Finally, Part F explores the contours of the approach and
describes how it can establish and maintain constitutional le-
gitimacy.
A brief caveat is in order before beginning to explore the
third-party approach to constitutional interpretation. In devel-
oping the approach, this section presents both a descriptive and
a normative account of its interpretive technique. In so doing, I
attempt to focus first and foremost on normativity. Most inter-
pretive methods are presented first as descriptive and then as
normative. This, I believe, leads to a realist trap.77 The trap cre-
ates the appearance that any claims regarding an interpretive
approach's normative value are merely ad hoc rationalizations
of judicial behavior, whether "activist" or "conservative." 78
By suggesting an interpretive method based on its norma-
tive force rather than its descriptive accuracy, this section aims
to articulate a means by which constitutional interpretation
might at least appear more legitimate. The idea is that an ideal
approach to constitutional interpretation will cloak its products
in the same shroud of legitimacy that surrounds the Constitution
itself. However, this section likely will not yield a determinate
solution to every difficult problem of constitutional law. In-
stead, the approach may provide a basis for attaching the same
sort of legitimacy to any solution to these problems as attaches
to the Constitution itself.
B. Third-party Beneficiaries in Contract Law: A Brief Primer
Treatment of third-party beneficiaries of contracts, as with
most issues in contract law, has been a matter of some conten-
77. Cf. Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Norma-
tivity in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 943 (1991) ("Balancing is only the term
we apply after the fact to describe what has been done. We assign the things their
weights, and then pretend that it is the scale that gives us the information.") (cita-
tion omitted).
78. See id.
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tion over the past 200 years. 79 Most of the debate has focused on
three relevant issues. First, commentators and courts have dis-
agreed as to whether individuals not party to a contract (and
thus not bound by its terms), but who would benefit from its
performance could enforce the contract in court.80 Second, even
if the law acknowledged the enforceability of contracts by ap-
propriate third-party beneficiaries, different approaches to iden-
tifying appropriate third-party beneficiaries competed for accep-
tance.81 Third, with consensus as to enforceability by and
identification of third-party beneficiaries, the question remained:
how to interpret contracts that third-parties seek to enforce. 82
The debate over these three issues does not serve as the primary
focus or concern of this section. Instead, discussion of these is-
sues provides a basis for understanding how contract law has
sought a legitimate approach to enforcing agreements that pro-
vide for benefits to individuals other than those who consented
to the agreement or are bound by its terms.
1. Enforcement of Contracts by Non-parties
The first concern that arises with regard to a third-party
79. "Historically, the rights of contract beneficiaries have been the subject of
doctrinal difficulties in both England and the United States." RESTATEMENT
SECOND, supra note 15, at ch. 14, Introductory Note. The extent of the doctrinal dif-
ficulties surrounding the third-party beneficiary rule is suggested by the fact that
modem recent commentaries dispute even whether the rule was indeed in dispute
(as well as whether to hyphenate "third-party"). Compare Abstract, Anthony Jon
Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (1985) ("[1In the seminal case of Lawrence v. Fox, the New
York Court of Appeals defied the prevailing rules of contractual liability by holding
that a third party-someone who was not a party to the contract.., could, never-
theless, enforce it."), with Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-party Beneficiaries, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1363 (1992) ("Although Lawrence v. Fox is often celebrated to-
day as a landmark case that established the power of a third-party beneficiary to
bring suit, in reality the case was not very remarkable for its time.") (citation omit-
ted). Although these two articles disagree on certain elements of the birth narrative
of third-party beneficiary rules, their accounts of current law prove consistent and
helpful. Notably, both authors agree that, during the second half of the eighteenth
century - which happens to coincide with the ratification of the Constitution-
"English law did permit some suits by beneficially interested third parties." Wa-
ters, supra, at 1113 n.6; see Eisenberg, supra, at 1361. Professor Eisenberg also insists
that early American courts followed the British lead. Eisenberg, supra, at 1361-62.
80. See infra Part IV.B.1.
81. See infra Part IV.B.2.
82. See infra Part IV.B.3. I do not mean to imply that these three issues were re-
solved in this chronological order. Instead, I present the issues in this order because
I believe that it reflects their relative logical priority in establishing a complete doc-
trine of third-party beneficiaries.
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beneficiary rule raises a threshold question. Specifically, should
the law ever permit someone other than a party to a contract to
enforce the contract's terms?83 The question is essentially one of
standing in that it is "the very first question that is sometimes
rudely asked when one person complains of another's actions:
'What's it to you?"' 84 During the latter half of the nineteenth
century, many courts doubted whether a third party attempting
to enforce a contract could ever provide an adequate answer to
that question.85
The primary objections to third-party enforcement of con-
tractual obligations appeal to the formal doctrines of privity and
consideration.8 6 Both of these technical objections, however, suf-
fer from fatal defects. The objection from lack of privity insists
that, to enforce its terms, a "plaintiff must have some legal inter-
est in the contract's undertaking."8 7 This, however, proves circu-
lar, "because the very question was whether a third-party benefi-
ciary had a legal interest in the undertaking."S The objection
from lack of consideration insists that valuable consideration
must flow from the plaintiff.89 This objection fails because con-
sideration is relevant only to determining whether a promise is
legally enforceable. Consideration has no relevance to deciding
who may enforce an enforceable promise.90
With the formal objections to third-party enforcement of
contracts refuted, the possibility of recognizing such actions be-
comes real. While technical arguments against claims by third-
party beneficiaries may fail, that fact does not necessarily give
reason for a permissive enforcement rule. Today, American law
accepts that at least some third-party beneficiaries can demand
83. See Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 1359-60.
84. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983) (discussing the standing re-
quirement of Article 1II).
85. As mentioned, commentators disagree on the extent to which pre-twentieth
century courts allowed actions by third parties. See supra note 79. Without doubt,
however, the case of Lawrence v. Fox has long been considered one of the most sig-
nificant recognitions of a third-party beneficiary's right to demand performance of a
contract. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 534-35 (2d
ed. 1985). Professor Eisenberg argues that after Lawrence, some American courts
began to disapprove of third-party actions. See Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 1367-68.
86. See Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 1370.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1370-71.
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performance of certain contracts.91 For whom and under what
circumstances the law will consider enforcement legitimate is
the next question that helps define the contours of the third-
party beneficiary rule.
2. Identifying Third-party Beneficiaries
With little, if any, dispute over whether a third party may
ever enforce a contract, most of the debate over the last one
hundred years has centered around what sort of claims by third
parties the courts should recognize.92 Courts and commentators
have, at various times, adopted any of three approaches to iden-
tifying third-party beneficiaries.9 3 Each approach can be traced
to one of several bases for the legitimacy of contract enforce-
ment.
The first Restatement of Contracts recognized third-party
beneficiaries only if they could be classified as "creditor" or
"donee" beneficiaries. 94 Those falling outside of these catego-
ries, and thus lacking the ability to enforce were called "inciden-
tal beneficiaries."9 5 A creditor beneficiary was one for whom
performance of the contract by the promisor would provide a
benefit that the promisee already had a duty to provide to the
91. See Waters, supra note 79, at 1111-12; see also RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra
note 15, § 304 ("A promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any in-
tended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may en-
force the duty.").
92. From this point, I use the term "third-party beneficiaries" to refer to that
class of individuals who the law permits to enforce contracts to which they were
not privy. While there may be many third parties who stand to benefit from the
performance of contracts to which they were not privy, the law recognizes claims
by only certain third parties. Courts often refer to both parties as third-party bene-
ficiaries, see Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 1360 n.4, but for economy, I will use the
term to mean only legally recognized third-party beneficiaries.
93. This basic taxonomy comes from Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 1376-84. Pro-
fessor Eisenberg finds defects in each of the approaches, and proposes a fourth al-
ternative, which he calls "the third-party-beneficiary principle." Id. at 1384-89.
Though the third-party-principle does solve some of the difficulties of the other ap-
proaches, it has been endorsed by only one court, in a decision later reversed. See
Leyba v. Whitley, 882 P.2d 26, 35-36 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 907 P.2d 172 (N.M.
1995). Because this fourth approach does not describe current law or a stage in its
evolution, and because the problems that it addresses do not arise in the context of
a third-party approach to constitutional interpretation, I will not consider Professor
Eisenberg's third-party beneficiary principle.
94. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 133, 135-136 (1932) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT FIRST].
95. Id. § 133(1)(c).
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
beneficiary.96 Suppose that A owes P $100. D wants A to paint
his house, and is willing to pay $100 for the service. D and A en-
ter into a contract whereby A paints the house and D pays A's
debt to P. Under this arrangement, P qualifies as a creditor
beneficiary of the contract between D and A, and can enforce the
contract if D fails to perform. If neither party to a contract owes
a prior duty to a third party, but the "purpose of the promisee in
obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof
is" to provide a gift or benefit to the third party, that third party
was a donee beneficiary under Restatement First.97 In both
cases, the rationale for permitting the third party to enforce a
contract to which he was not privy, concerns protection for the
contracting parties.
The Restatement First approach derived from the belief that
contracts should be enforced "to facilitate the power of self-
governing parties to further their own interests by contract-
ing."98 While a broad recognition of third-party rights to enforce
contracts would conflict with this principle, limiting the class of
third-party beneficiaries to donee and creditor beneficiaries os-
tensibly furthers this principle. In this way, the Restatement
First approach grounds third-party beneficiary enforcement in
the legitimacy of contract enforcement generally.
Courts seeking to apply the Restatement First test encoun-
tered difficulty in fitting many cases into the approach's taxon-
omy.99 For simplicity of analysis, most courts adopted an "in-
tent-to-benefit test."100 Under this test, the court recognizes a
third-party beneficiary if the promisee or the parties to the con-
tract intended to benefit that individual.' 0' Although courts
have displayed some inconsistency in applying the intent-to-
benefit test, the general trend has been to look for clear evidence
of the subjective intent of the parties. 0 2 As with the Restatement
First test, the intent-to-benefit test grounds the legitimacy of
third-party beneficiary enforcement of contracts in the principle
96. See id.
97. See Id. § 133(1)(a).
98. Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 1374.
99. See id. at 1377-78.
100. Id.
101. Although there has been some dispute as to whether both parties, or only
the promisee, must intend to benefit a third-party beneficiary, this issue does not
arise in the context of constitutional interpretation. See id.
102. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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that the law ought to effectuate the will of contracting parties.103
The Restatement Second, on its face, combines elements of
the Restatement First and intent-to-benefit tests.104 In its black-
letter text, the Restatement Second therefore simplifies the no-
menclature, but fails to provide a new approach. In a comment,
however, the Restatement Second suggests a break from the
party-centered approach and endorses a focus on the perspec-
tive of the beneficiary. 10 5 Comment D suggests that a third-party
beneficiary may enforce an agreement when there is a "manifes-
tation of intention by the promisee and promisor sufficient, in a
contractual setting, to make reliance by the beneficiary both rea-
sonable and probable." 106
Focusing only on this comment, the Restatement Second
appears to adopt a reasonability-of-reliance test. By looking to
whether a third party might reasonably rely upon an agreement
to which he is not privy, this test seeks objective manifestations
of an intent to benefit and embraces a new basis for legiti-
macy.1 07 A reasonability-of-reliance test derives its legitimacy
from the principle that contracts perform social functions be-
yond the sphere occupied by their parties. If we enforce agree-
ments to the extent that they tend to induce others to act in reli-
ance, whether the parties intended to induce reliance matters
less than whether reliance was reasonable.
Of these three approaches to identifying third-party benefi-
ciaries, none has achieved clear dominance. Instead, courts tend
to combine elements of all three.108 In most clear cases, of which
I believe the Constitution is one, the choice of approach will not
affect the determination of third-party beneficiary status.
3. Interpreting Contracts Benefiting Third Parties
Once a court has decided to recognize a third-party benefi-
ciary, by whatever approach it may use, it must ask the distinct
question of how the contract ought to be interpreted. The court
might use whatever contract principles it would otherwise em-
ploy in interpretation. Upon recognition that the third-party
103. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
104. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 15, § 302; see also Eisenberg, supra note
69, at 1383.
105. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 15, § 302 cmt. d.
106. Id.
107. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 15, § 302.
108. See Eisenberg, supra note 79, at 1382-83.
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beneficiary may legitimately enforce the contract, the interpre-
tive problem changes. While a court might otherwise be free to
choose from a wide spectrum of objective and subjective ap-
proaches to interpretation, the presence of a third-party benefi-
ciary introduces another set of subjective expectations.
One response to the expectations of the third-party benefici-
aries would be to deem them irrelevant, which would be consis-
tent with classical contract law.109 Ignoring reasonable interpre-
tations of terms upon which a third-party beneficiary has relied
in deference to subjective, but unexpressed, intentions of the
parties, however, leads to problematic results. At the same time,
giving primacy to the subjective expectations of the third-party
beneficiary, one who has no obligation under the contract,
would seem to derogate from basic principles of contract legiti-
macy.
As a solution, "the intentionalism of contemporary contract
interpretation is relaxed a bit when it comes to third-party bene-
ficiary contracts." 110 When a third-party beneficiary seeks to en-
force a contract, courts place greater emphasis on objective
manifestation of the contracting parties' intent.111 This approach
permits the third-party beneficiary to rely on reasonable inter-
pretations of the contract's terms, without subjugating the objec-
tives of the parties to the satisfaction of third-party reliance that
the parties could not have foreseen.
C. Who Are the Parties to the Constitution-as-Contract?
1. Neither We the People nor They the People Were Parties to
the Constitution
One might claim that one or both of two entities called "The
People" ought to be treated as party to the Constitution-as-
contract. As the intertemporal precommitment problem seems
to presume, one might believe that the People at the time of rati-
fication, "They the People," were party to the Constitution. One
might also believe that "We the People"-meaning the citizens of
the United States since the founding-are party to the Constitu-
tion. Neither of these claims finds support in the terms or cir-
109. See id. at 1376-84.
110. Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains?" The Failure of
the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1174 (1998) (dis-
cussing the problems of contract interpretation as applied to legislative intent).
111. See id. at 1175.
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cumstances of the document. Looking at the Constitution-as-
contract, we have no reason to believe that either We the People
or They the People should be treated as party to the agreement
that it embodies.
This article has shown that the circumstances under which
the Constitution was ratified belie any assertion of direct in-
volvement by The People of the United States at that time as
such." 2 Nonetheless, the opening words of the Constitution, de-
claring its source to be "We the People of the United States,"
carry such rhetorical force that the issue requires further treat-
ment. From the basic view of contract formation, if the People
are to be treated as parties to the Constitution-as-contract, it
must be because they either made or accepted an offer with in-
tent to be bound.113
Considering first the question of whether The People ac-
cepted the offer embodied by the Constitution, the circum-
stances and text of the document, in light of the basic law of con-
tract formation, provide clear guidance. As already discussed,
114
the circumstances surrounding the ratification demonstrate that
the People of the United States as such, did not ratify the Consti-
tution. Not only did they, acting in their capacity as the People
of the United States, fail to accept the Constitution, they lacked
the power of acceptance under the terms of the offer. The Re-
statement Second provides that the "manifested intention of the
offeror determines the person or persons in whom is created a
power of acceptance."" l5 Article VII provides a clear manifesta-
tion of to whom the offeror intended to extend the power of ac-
ceptance. Acceptance of the Constitution could come from only
the State Conventions. By its terms, the Constitution would not
have been established even if a popular vote by They the People
produced unanimous support.
A slightly more plausible account of They the People as par-
ties to the Constitution-as-contract stresses the opening language
of the document in suggesting that the offer emanated from the
People. Although appealing in view of the populist tone of the
112. See supra Part III.A.
113. "The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily takes the
form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance by the other
party or parties." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 15, § 22.
114. See supra Part III.A.
115. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 15, § 29. Similarly, "[an offer can be ac-
cepted only by a person whom it invites to furnish the consideration." Id. § 52.
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Constitution's first words, this position suffers from two related
flaws. First, the fact that a document invokes a particular au-
thority or purports to originate from a certain source does not,
alone, support those claims.116 It is clear that They the People
did not write the Constitution, and that the offer did not issue
directly from that entity. For one to believe that The People au-
thorized the offer would require more than the fact that the offer
invokes that name.
Second, we do have a good idea of who wrote the Constitu-
tion and upon whose authority,117 and we know that They the
People were not involved. In the most basic sense, the delegates
who took part in the Philadelphia Convention wrote the Consti-
tution. As their titles suggest, however, the delegates did not
craft the document on their own behalf. If we conceive of the
Convention's result as a contractual offer, the delegates as indi-
viduals were not the offerors. They acted on behalf of some
other entity, for whom they had the authority to speak. For
now, we need not describe that entity. It is enough to observe
that the delegates clearly did not meet in Philadelphia as repre-
sentatives of They the People nor did they speak with the au-
thority of the national population as such.
Each delegate who attended the Philadelphia Convention
did so on the authority of two political entities. First, Congress,
composed primarily of delegates appointed by state legislatures,
passed a resolution calling for each of the states to appoint dele-
gates to attend the Convention in Philadelphia.118 Second, the
116. I cannot make Bill Gates a party to a contract to pay me one billion dollars
by simply writing a contract that says "I Bill Gates agree to pay one billion dollars
to Eric Parnes." At root, the question is one of authority. I simply lack the author-
ity to speak for Bill Gates just as, I suggest, the framers lacked the authority to
speak for They the People.
117. I discuss the relevance of the composition and origin of the Philadelphia
Convention in subsections 2 and 3 of this section. See infra Part IV.C.2-3.
118. The resolution read:
Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that on the second
Monday in May next a convention of delegates who shall have been appointed
by the several states be held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose
of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the
several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when
agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal con-
stitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of
the Union.
1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 187
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (emphasis added) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION].
2003]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
state legislatures appointed delegates to the Convention.119 Nei-
ther of these political entities tenably equates to They the Peo-
ple.1 20
Once we have demonstrated that They the People is not a
party to the Constitution-as-contract, denial of party status to
We the People-all Americans-follows without difficulty. We
need not address theories121 postulating mechanisms by which
each generation conmits to the Constitution. Even if these
mechanisms operate, and every American has committed to the
Constitution, such a commitment does not make We the People
party to the agreement. Commitment to the terms of a contract
by a non-party has no effect on the contract or its parties. For
example, I might fully and vocally express my agreement to a
contract between my neighbor and the person buying his house,
but my assent does not make me a party to their agreement.
2. The Promisees: The Several States
Looking at the terms of the Constitution-as-contract, and
building on the discussion of the mechanism of accep-
tance/ratification, 122 the identity of the promisee to whom the
offer extended the power of acceptance may appear obvious.
Indeed, the language of the document and the circumstances
surrounding its establishment clearly point to the states as one
set of parties to the Constitution-as-contract. Accepting these
indicators, some doubt may remain on the nature of the states as
parties. One can speak of the states, in their ratifying capacities,
as parties in two different, but overlapping, senses. The states
mean either the government of each state or the people of each
state qua state citizens, and each meaning could differently af-
fect our understanding of the Constitution-as-contract.
The Constitution-as-contract contains a seemingly straight-
forward specification of the parties to whom it extends its offer
and the method by which they might accept. 123 Article VII pro-
119. See THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 50. Notably, one state,
Rhode Island, did not send delegates. See Patrick T. Conley, supra note 60, at 273.
Rhode Island's Governor wrote to the President of the Continental Congress ex-
plaining that the state legislature could not appoint national delegates because
Rhode Island law empowered the citizens of the state to elect delegates to Congress.
See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 58, at 505.
120. See infra Part IV.C.2.
121. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25.
122. See supra Part III.A.
123. See U.S. CONST. art. VII; see also supra Part III.A.
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vides that "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States,
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution be-
tween the States so Ratifying the Same."1 24 Ambiguities arise,
however, largely because the document appears to use the same
sentence to both identify the offerees and prescribe the mecha-
nism of acceptance. This economy of words complicates our
task of identifying the set of parties to which Article VII refers.
Beginning within the four corners of the document, two in-
terpretations appear equally plausible, but permit us to refine
our terms. First, one might read the first phrase, "the Conven-
tions of nine States," as a specification of the mechanism of ac-
ceptance, and read the phrase "the States so Ratifying" to desig-
nate the class of parties empowered to accept. Second, one
might read the first phrase to identify the offerees without re-
quiring a precise form of acceptance. On the first reading, the
offerees-the states-may accept the Constitution-as-contract only
by the mechanism of "Conventions." On the second reading, the
offerees-the state Conventions-have the option of accepting in
any reasonable manner that they might choose.125
While these two readings may appear at odds, it is impor-
tant to note that both can ascribe essentially equivalent mean-
ings to each of the two central terms: States and Conventions.
This is not to say that they necessarily define these terms in the
same way. Instead, by assuming the same meanings for the
terms, the two readings do not compromise their distinctiveness.
What then, are these meanings, and what is the root distinction
between the two readings?
Defining "States" as used in Article VII is fairly straightfor-
ward, at least for these purposes. A State is simply a geographi-
cally defined political entity. What then, would it mean for a
State to accept the offer embodied by the Constitution-as-
contract? Answering this question proves complicated. Fortu-
nately, however, the two readings allow one to dodge the ques-
tion without compromising the inquiry, for neither reading re-
quires a definition of States that specifies general criteria for
ascribing behaviors to such entities. On the first reading, all that
we need to know about States we learn from the fact that "Rati-
124. U.S. CONST. art. VII. The last phrase may raise issues regarding the identity
of the other party, as I will consider in the next subsection. See infra Part IV.C.3.
125. "Unless otherwise indicated by the language or the circumstances, an offer
invites acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circum-
stances." RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 15, § 30.
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fication of the Conventions" of each State constitutes formal ac-
ceptance of the Constitution-as-contract. Presumably, this
means that a State could prevent this situation.126 On the second
reading, one need not be concerned with how a State might ac-
cept the offer, because the offer was not for the States to accept.
Instead, the second reading appears to recognize the Conven-
tions of the States as the party empowered to pass on the Consti-
tution-as-contract's offer.
To evaluate the two possibilities, one must define "Conven-
tion" with somewhat more precision than that necessary for the
first pass at defining States. One must also look beyond the
document itself for guidance. Fortunately, one need not look far,
as the Constitution arrived at the legislatures of each State ac-
companied by instructions on the formation of Conventions.
127
The instructions clearly define the composition of a State Con-
vention as delegates chosen by the people of that State.1 28 The
actual compositions of the Conventions comported with these
instructions. 129
126. It would be absurd to ascribe intention to an entity's behavior if the entity
cannot prevent that behavior. On a similar note, "to say one has consented requires
that there have been some way of withholding consent." HERZOG, supra note 49, at
225.
127. On Friday, September 28, 1787:
Congress having received the report of the Convention lately assembled in
Philadelphia Resolved Unanimously that the said Report with the resolu-
tions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to the several legis-
latures in Order to be submitted to a convention of Delegates chosen in
each state by the people thereof in conformity to the resolves of the Con-
vention made and provided in that case.
RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS SUBMITTING THE CONSTITUTION TO THE SEVERAL STATES,
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
22 (1894) [hereinafter RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS].
In accordance with this resolution, the state legislatures received the resolu-
tion of the Constitutional Convention providing that the Constitution should "be
submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof,
under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification."
RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONVENTION RECOMMENDING THE PROCEDURES FOR
RATIFICATION AND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GOVERNMENT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE CONFEDERATION CONGRESS, reprinted in 1 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 317-18 (Merrill
Jenson ed., 1976).
128. The next clause would seem to complicate matters, in that it appears to con-
template some role for state legislatures. The awkward grammar of the sentence,
however, makes difficult a determination of the precise meaning of this clause. Be-
cause reservation of any type of role for the state legislatures would tend to support
my conclusions, we need not dissect the Resolution's language.
129. See THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 50 (describing the elec-
tion of ratification-Convention delegates in each state).
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With this definition of Conventions and the instructions
upon which it is based, one can begin to merge both readings
into a coherent vision of the class of parties that may have ac-
cepted the Constitution-as-contract. Both readings answer two
important questions in the same way. First, if one asks to whose
decision we should look to determine whether the Constitution
has been accepted, the readings must provide a common an-
swer. Second, if one asks for whom the decision-maker was au-
thorized to speak, the two readings will arrive at, though via dif-
ferent routes, the same response.
The answer to the first question proves fairly straightfor-
ward given the workings of the Conventions and the role that
the Conventions play on both readings. On the first reading, the
Conventions act as the mechanism for acceptance. If one wants
to know whether the Constitution-as-contract has been accepted,
one asks if the mechanism has produced the appropriate output.
The question then becomes who determined what output the
mechanism would produce. The second reading might seem to
supply an answer, but it is important that the response not differ
from that which the first reading would provide. Whether one
conceives of the Convention as the mechanism by which some
party accepts or the actual party that does the accepting, the ba-
sic operation of the Convention remains constant. The Conven-
tion,130 although composed of delegates elected by the people,
made the decision.
The State Conventions decided whether to accept the Con-
stitution-as-contract. Although this runs counter to the implica-
tions of the first reading, which implies that the states decided,
and of the second reading, which implies that the people of each
state decided, the function of the Conventions renders this con-
clusion irresistible. Everything about the Conventions suggests
that they contemplated delegates who would deliberate and de-
bate rather than serve as mere conduits.131 The delegates to each
130. Ascribing the decision-making function to an institution may seem awk-
ward. The alternative formulation, asserting that the delegates decided, would not
really alter the point in this context. Nonetheless, because the delegates as indi-
viduals did not produce the relevant decisions, and because the delegates in their
collective capacities were called Conventions, I believe it most accurate to identify
the institutions as decision-makers.
131. This role might not be clear from the language of the Constitution or the
Resolutions. Nonetheless, at least three considerations support the claim that the
Conventions were conceived of as deliberative bodies. First, given that the framers
meeting in Philadelphia had used the word "Convention" to describe their patently
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Convention did not deliver their constituents' proxies to be tal-
lied. In other words, they were not delegates at all. 132 The State
Conventions did not simply communicate the will of another en-
tity. The Conventions decided, regardless of whether we believe
them to have been the parties or the mechanism.
Realizing that the Conventions decided whether to accept
might lead to the conclusion, suggested by the second reading,
that they were the parties to whom the offer of the Constitution-
as-contract was extended. To do so, however, would ignore the
function of the Conventions' decisions-their consequences such
that we care what the Conventions decided-as well as the im-
portant issue of authority.
One might ask what consequences flowed from the deci-
sions of the Conventions. The obvious answer is ratification and
the establishment of the Constitution. What, however, could
this mean? The important question seems to be: who did the de-
cisions of the Conventions bind to the terms of the Constitution-
as-contract? As a preliminary matter, an answer will dispel any
notion that the Conventions acted on their own behalves in rati-
fying the Constitution as parties. The Constitution does not bind
the Conventions as such, because their existence terminates
upon issuance of a decision. It would be meaningless for the
deliberative assembly, we may safely assume that they had this usage in mind
when they used the word "Conventions" in their Resolution to Congress. For an
indication of the extent of deliberation at the Philadelphia Convention, see gener-
ally 1-5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, ELLIOT'S DEBATES (2d ed. 1907). Second, had the fram-
ers sought to base ratification on the will of the People of the several states, they
could have specified direct referenda as the mechanisms for acceptance. Third, and
perhaps most tellingly, the delegates to the Conventions of every state did, in fact,
deliberate in some way. See THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 50
(providing accounts of the deliberations in all thirteen of the State Conventions).
132. See HERZOG, supra note 49, at 210. I deny that they functioned in this way in
the sense that a delegate is one to whom another delegates his vote. This meaning
makes sense if we consider that we have another term available to describe a person
whom another entrusts with his decision-making authority: a trustee. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the Convention delegates functioned no more as trustees
than they did as delegates. A trustee is one who has been authorized by another
person to make decisions that that person would otherwise have the power to
make. In order to authorize a trustee to make particular decisions on your behalf,
those decisions must otherwise be within your competence to make. Whether to
accept the Constitution was a decision outside of the competence of the people as
such. See supra Part III.
In some instances, voters attempted to elect delegates who would act like
delegates in the proxy-voting sense. Because the Convention design presumed de-
liberation, however, delegates were not bound by any such commitments. In New
Hampshire, for example, three delegates elected with instructions to vote against
ratification chose not to vote at all. See Daniell, supra note 55, at 196-98.
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Conventions to accept the offer if they did not do so for some
other parties.
Who, then, were the parties? Here, it is not enough to look
to the document because, as I have suggested, 133 a contract's
specification of the parties cannot alone serve to create obliga-
tions in those parties. Thus, we must decide upon whose au-
thority did the Conventions make their decisions. Instinctively,
we might look to the people of each state who elected the dele-
gates to the Convention, and by thus authorizing the Conven-
tions to exercise decision-making power, the people of each state
are parties to the Constitution-as-contract. This intuition-in
spite of its initial appeal-proves inconsistent with the circum-
stances in a subtle but important way.
If we focus on who elected the delegates to the Conventions,
the people of each state may appear the logical holders of party
status. If, however, we ask the more fundamental question of
how the delegates were elected, another set of parties, the states
as representative democracies, becomes central. The people of
each state elected the delegates to the Conventions, but they did
so in a framework fixed by another entity. The legislatures of
the states called the elections, defined voting districts, appor-
tioned representation, and established suffrage requirements. 34
The people of each state, as such, lacked the authority to make a
decision and thus could not have authorized the Conventions to
do so in their steads. They could do so only within a framework
supplied by the Constitution, the Resolution stating the mecha-
nism for acceptance, and the state legislatures.
These observations do not, however, support the conclusion
that the state legislatures were party to the Constitution. They
also lacked the authority to do so on their own. It would not
constitute an acceptance if each of the state legislatures passed a
resolution accepting the terms of the Constitution. The legisla-
tures simply lacked the authority to accept, and thus could not
have been parties to the Constitution-as-contract.
Who then? The simple answer is that the states are parties
to the Constitution-as-contract. Without further explanation,
however, this answer would be empty-it could mean the states
as geographical regions or as collections of citizens or as political
133. See supra text accompanying note 116.
134. Several states altered their ordinary suffrage requirements for the Conven-
tion elections. See Roll, supra note 58.
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entities. It is, in fact, this last meaning that proves accurate. The
only parties capable of authorizing the Conventions to decide
whether to accept the Constitution-as-contract were the states as
political entities, but only as political entities of a very particular
sort. A state ruled by monarchy could not have accepted the
Constitution-as-contract, even if it had called a Convention. In-
stead, the only parties from whom the offer invited acceptance
were states with legislatures that called elections of their citizens
to select delegates to the Conventions.135
This may seem like a trivial point, but it speaks to the nature
of the parties that accepted the offer embodied in the Constitu-
tion-as-contract. Not just any state could accept and enter into
the agreement. Only states with sufficiently representative sys-
tems of government were invited to become party to the Consti-
tution-as-contract. 136 The mechanism of ratification proved the
parties' fitness to uphold the terms of the agreement. Thus, the
states as very particular types of political entities were party to
the Constitution-as-contract.
3. The Promisor: The Federal Government
If the states, as particular sorts of political entities, stood as
promisees of the Constitution-as-contract, there must have been
some entity that extended the offer, a promisor. In spite of the
populist rhetoric of its first words, the offer embodied in the
Constitution could not have emanated from They the People.137
Instead, the offer appears to have issued from the Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia. Through analysis similar to that
applied to the roles of the state ratifying conventions, however,
it will become clear that neither the Philadelphia Convention nor
135. See supra text accompanying notes 116-119.
136. This prerequisite to party status may be read alongside of, but ought not be
confused with, the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, which provides that "The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Guarantee Clause, rather than specify-
ing the nature of the states-as-parties, extends the protection of the National gov-
ernment to states that have already become parties. The clause therefore is just one
of many examples of valuable consideration extended to states-as-parties. That
such a guarantee indeed constituted valuable consideration speaks to the nature of
the promisees. After all, the guarantee of a republican form of government would
probably not be considered valuable consideration to a monarchy or despotism.
For an interesting discussion of the Guarantee Clause, as it arose in an action for
trespass, see Note, Political Rights as Political Questions: The Paradox of Luther v. Bor-
den, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1127-28 (1987).
137. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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the delegates of which it was composed could have made the of-
fer. Instead, the offer issued on behalf of some other entity that
would become party to the Constitution-as-contract upon accep-
tance by the states. A look at the circumstances of the framing
and an analysis of the authority-or lack thereof -under which
the offer embodied in the Constitution was made will lead to the
conclusion that the Federal Government is the promisor party to
the Constitution-as-contract.
From the basic story of the Constitution's framing and its is-
suance to the states, two clear candidates emerge as possible
promisors.138 As an initial matter, one might plausibly claim that
either the Philadelphia Convention, which framed the docu-
ment, or the Confederation Congress, which sent it to the states,
made the offer embodied in the Constitution-as-contract. Such
assertions, however, cannot withstand scrutiny.
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention drafted the
Constitution, and thus might be candidates for party status. Of
course, something more than physical authorship is needed to
find that the Convention, or the delegates of which it was com-
posed actually made the offer. After all, law firms routinely
draft contracts to which they are not party. If the delegates or
the Convention are to be considered party to the Constitution-
as-contract, they must have made the offer on their own behalf.
As with the ratifying conventions' decisions, 139 the practical ef-
fect of the Philadelphia Convention's product makes clear that it
could not have made an offer on its own behalf. "An offer is the
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as
to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that
bargain is invited and will conclude it."140 Nothing in the text of
the Constitution or any other communications from the Conven-
tion manifests the willingness of the Convention or its delegates
to enter into a bargain with the states. The fact that the Phila-
delphia Convention ceased to exist after it had drafted the Con-
stitution renders highly dubious the possibility that it had the
capacity to enter into a bargain.
138. For an extremely basic account of the framing, see supra Part iv.C.1. For
more detailed accounts of the Philadelphia Convention's operation, see generally
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 25; Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 58; Akhil
R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).
139. See supra Part IV.C.2.
140. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 15, § 24.
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If the Philadelphia Convention did not make the offer on its
own behalf, perhaps it extended the offer on behalf of some
other entity. As mentioned earlier,141 the delegates convened in
Philadelphia on the authority of two political entities. First, the
Confederation Congress, a body composed primarily of dele-
gates appointed by state legislatures, 142 passed a resolution call-
ing for each state to appoint delegates to attend the Philadelphia
Convention.143 Second, most of the state legislatures appointed
delegates to the Convention. 144 Perhaps the Convention ex-
tended the offer on behalf of one of these entities-the Confedera-
tion Congress or the state legislatures?
If the Philadelphia Convention extended the offer embodied
in the Constitution-as-contract on behalf of either Congress or
the state legislatures such that that entity became bound upon
the promisees' acceptance, it could only have done so upon
proper authority. Neither Congress nor the state legislatures,
however, granted the Convention the authority to extend this of-
fer on their behalf. In its resolution calling upon delegates to
meet in Philadelphia, the Confederation Congress expressly de-
fined the limited scope of the Convention's task, 45 specifying
that a convention was to "be held at Philadelphia for the sole and
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation."146 Extend-
ing an offer in the form of a new Constitution-one providing for
a ratification/acceptance mechanism in clear violation of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation-fell far beyond the scope of authority
conveyed to the Convention to act on Congress's behalf. 47
The same problem of authority confronts any claim that the
Convention acted on behalf of state legislatures. Even if the
state legislatures had authorized their delegates to take action
beyond recommending revisions to the Articles of Confedera-
tion (clearly counterfactual),148 the Convention would nonethe-
less have lacked authority to make an offer on behalf of the
141. See supra Part IV.C.1.
142. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CIVILIZATION 170 (1937).
143. See HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 118, at 187.
144. See supra note 119.
145. See HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 118, at 187.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 58, at 506 ("Illegality was a leitmotif at
the convention from its first days to its last.").
148. In fact, several of the delegates were appointed with commissions strictly
limiting the scope of their authority to speak for their states. See id. at 481-83.
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states. This is because Congress, and not the states, called the
Convention and defined its terms.149 The Convention was not a
creature of the state legislatures, but one hatched by the Confed-
eration Congress, which specified its nature as one limited to re-
vising the Articles of Confederation.150 The state legislatures
could not have authorized the Convention to extend an offer on
their behalves, because the authority of the state legislatures
relative to the Convention was limited by Congress.
Although these circumstances make clear that the Conven-
tion did not extend the offer of Constitution-as-contract on be-
half of the Confederation Congress, the possibility remains that
Congress directly extended the offer after having received the
document drafted by the Convention. This account has a strong
appeal in light of the events that followed the Convention's con-
clusion. Support comes, in particular, from the following resolu-
tion:
Congress having received the report of the Convention lately
assembled in Philadelphia Resolved Unanimously that the
said Report with the resolutions and letter accompanying the
same be transmitted to the several legislatures in Order to be
submitted to a convention of Delegates chosen in each state
by the people thereof in conformity to the resolves of the
Convention made and provided in that case.' 5 '
Congress, it might appear, approved of the Constitution-as-
contract and decided to extend its offer to the states. Under this
account, the Confederation Congress was party to the Constitu-
tion-as-contract.
The problem with this account, once again, arises when
considering the issue of authority. The Confederation Congress
was not an independent political entity bound only by the limits
of its discretion. Instead, the Articles of Confederation defined
and limited the Confederation Congress' power.15 2 Contracting
with the states to create a new Constitution was simply beyond
the authority of the Confederation Congress.
Difficulties identifying an existing political entity with the
capacity and authority to make the offer embodied in the Consti-
tution-as-contract lead to the conclusion that the offer did not ex-
tend from an existing political entity. Instead, the promisor was
149. See HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 118, at 187.
150. See id.
151. RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS, supra note 127, at 22.
152. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 28.
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the entity that derived its existence from the ratification of the
Constitution-the federal government. For its part, the federal
government offered, among other things, to protect the states
and provide benefits to their citizens.153 In return, the federal
government received certain powers previously held by the
states and, more essentially, came into being. 54
D. Who Are the Third-party Beneficiaries of the Constitution-as-
Contract?
An attempt to locate instances in which the text of the Con-
stitution names its intended beneficiaries yields several promis-
ing candidates, 55 but none so clear as to preclude objection. For-
tunately, the third-party beneficiary rules that have evolved in
contract law acknowledge that an agreement may create obliga-
tions to third-parties even if it does not name the beneficiaries. 5 6
Where confusion exists as to the identity of any potential third-
party beneficiary, one looks for both subjective and objective
manifestations of the intent of the parties to provide a benefit to
a third party. 5 7
If one begins this analysis with the Bill of Rights, the text of
the Constitution can lead to no conclusion other than that the
parties intended to provide benefits to third parties. None of the
first nine Amendments, after all, pertains directly to the relation-
ship between the contracting parties, the States and the Federal
Government. Instead, these Amendments obligate the promisor,
the Federal Government, to limit its activities as they might af-
fect individuals not party to the Constitution-as-contract. By re-
153. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I-IV.
154. The idea of an offer emanating from an entity whose existence depends on
the offer's acceptance may seem unusual. Analogous accounts, however, help to
explain the existence of many legal creatures of contract. The most common illus-
tration of this sort of contract-derived existence is the idea of a corporation as an
entity born of a contract between itself, the state, and its shareholders. See Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1426-27 (1989) (describing the idea of a corporation as a nexus of con-
tracts).
155. In its preamble, for example, the Constitution declares as one of its objec-
tives, to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." U.S.
CONST. PMBL. We, as the founding generation's "Posterity" might point to this text
in support of an action for specific performance of the Federal Government's con-
tractual duty to secure for us the blessings of liberty.
156. "It is not essential to the creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that
he be identified when a contract containing the promise is made." RESTATEMENT
SECOND, supra note 15, § 308.
157. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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quiring the forbearance of one of the parties for the benefit of
third parties, the Bill of Rights presents the paradigm of a third-
party beneficiary contract.158 The identity of the third-party
beneficiary will vary with the nature of the benefit and its speci-
fication.159
E. Contemporary Americans and the Cons titu tion-as-Con tract
Much of the Constitution does not apply in any way, either
by providing an obligation or by guaranteeing a benefit, to the
citizens of the United States. Generally, when the Constitution
applies to Americans in legally significant ways,160 it does so by
obligating the government to forebear in its activities so as to
provide us with certain benefits. This situation characterizes the
vast majority of constitutional claims in which a citizen might be
involved.
As a whole, the Constitution simply does not impose obliga-
tions on citizens-it makes demands of government, often for the
benefit of citizens. There are, however, two notable exceptions
to this characterization of the Constitution. As Professor Tribe
has noted,
there are two ways, and two ways only, in which an ordinary
private citizen.., can violate the United States Constitution.
One is to enslave somebody [a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment]. The other is to bring a bottle of beer, wine, or
bourbon into a state in violation of its beverage control laws
[in violation of the Twenty-first Amendment]. 161
158. Here, I should note that the third-party beneficiary approach, combined
with the principles of objectively reasonable reliance, can act as a ratchet in favor of
rights. Each time one of the parties (or the Judiciary, the entity established to pro-
vide interpretations of the Constitution-as-contract that would bind the parties) in-
terprets a constitutional provision to provide a benefit to a third party in the form of
a rights protection, the class of third-parties to whom that benefit applies have a
reasonable basis for relying on the obligation of one or both of the parties to con-
tinue providing that benefit/right.
159. For instance, one can make a credible argument that the Sixth Amendment
was enacted for the benefit of only those accused of crimes. Or, one could reasona-
bly conclude that soldiers seeking shelter at time of peace are not beneficiaries of
the Third Amendment.
160. Of course the Constitution applies to us in many ways if, by applying we
mean that it affects our lives. But such a definition proves vacuous, almost any
event has the potential to affect our lives. In this respect, I could argue that an
agreement between my neighbor and the child of another neighbor for lawn-
mowing services applies to me, because the child might not be able to take on an-
other job pruning my trees.
161. Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying, in
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These two provisions represent anomalies of the Constitution.
They are useful, however, to demonstrate why the intertemporal
precommitment problem does not apply even where provisions
of the Constitution limit our behavior.
F. Interpreting the Constitution-as-Contract: A Third-party
Beneficiary Approach
Looking at the Constitution as a contract between the fed-
eral government and the states (as inclusive political entities) for
the benefit of third-parties entails a new approach to constitu-
tional interpretation. The approach begins with and maintains
the legitimacy of whatever constitutional authority is at issue. In
this way, interpreting the Constitution-as-contract differs from
other interpretive enterprises. Nonetheless, the contours of the
third-party beneficiary approach should feel familiar. In es-
sence, the approach simply requires application of principles of
contract interpretation to the task of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Of course, just as commentators disagree on the precise
doctrines that should guide contract interpretation, so too is
there ample room for debate on how best to interpret the Consti-
tution-as-contract. The debates should, in fact, be identical.
Thus, the third-party beneficiary approach consolidates discus-
sions of constitutional interpretation and contract interpreta-
tion 62
Just as one can take many different principled positions on
contract legitimacy and interpretation, so can one defend a vari-
ety of approaches to describing and interpreting the Constitu-
tion-as-contract; both sides can engage in principled debate
within a coherent framework.
V. CONCLUSION
Conventional approaches to constitutional interpretation,
insofar as they fail to establish and preserve the legitimacy of the
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 98, 100 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
162. Aside from the basic legitimizing function achieved by an identity of ap-
proaches, discussing constitutional interpretation in the same terms with which we
discuss contract interpretation may promote more refined and well-reasoned prin-
ciples of interpretation. For, given the extent to which contracts are used to define
countless relationships and activities, perverse or incoherent doctrines of contract
interpretation are likely to be exposed more quickly than are incoherent doctrines of
an interpretive enterprise that is conceived of as sui generis.
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Constitution cannot make valid claims to the legitimacy of their
products. The misguided nature of most accounts of the Consti-
tution and its meaning is apparent in their persistent struggle to
overcome the intertemporal precommitment problem-a di-
lemma that persists only so long as one blindly accepts a mythi-
cal narrative of constitution formation and popular sovereignty
lacking any basis in fact or logic.
With the fictions of popular sovereignty and popular ratifi-
cation of the Constitution exposed, the intertemporal precom-
mitment problem dissolves. Once we have charged through this
false obstacle to constitutional legitimacy, the prospect of de-
scribing an approach to constitutional interpretation that is both
legitimate and legitimating becomes real. Contract law-as an
enterprise fundamentally concerned with interpreting docu-
ments so as to establish and maintain their source of author-
ity-provides an ideal model for this approach to constitutional
interpretation.
The text of the Constitution and the circumstances sur-
rounding its framing and ratification provide strong support for
a Constitution-as-contract approach to interpretation. Crucial to
articulating a coherent account of the Constitution-as-contract is
the refutation of the mythical role of They the People-the undif-
ferentiated people of the United States at the time of the fram-
ing-in ratifying the Constitution. They the People did not ratify
the Constitution-as-contract, and were not party to the agree-
ment embodied in the document. Instead, They the People, as
well as We the People-present-day Americans-are the intended
beneficiaries of an agreement between the federal government
and the individual states.
Conceiving of the Constitution as a contract between the
states and the federal government that obliges the government
to provide benefits to third parties permits the application of
contract principles to questions of constitutional interpretation.
While the precise nature of these principles may be a valid sub-
ject of debate, the importance of providing some account of a
contract's legitimacy remains central. Thus, the third-party
beneficiary approach to interpreting the Constitution-as-contract
will not dictate an indisputable solution to every problem of
constitutional interpretation. Instead, the approach provides a
framework within which one or another conception of the
source of contractual legitimacy will lead to an interpretation of
the Constitution that provides a basis for establishing and main-
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taining the legitimacy of that document. In this way, the third-
party beneficiary approach brings coherence, if not determinacy,
to constitutional interpretation.
